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SMEDLEY V. SMEDLEY, 772 F.3D 184
(4TH CIR. 2014).
THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY
ON THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Mary Rose Pritchard*
INTRODUCTION
Germany and the U.S. are two of the original signatories to the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (Hague Convention). 1 The purposes of the Hague
Convention and its implementing statute, the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, are to secure “the prompt return of
children who have been wrongfully removed or retained” in any
contracting state by one parent.2 In addition, they seek to ensure that
countries respect the “rights of custody and of access under the law
of” other countries. 3 In implementing the Hague Convention,
Congress recognized “the need for uniform international
interpretation” among contracting states. 4 The comity of nations

*

Candidate for Juris Doctor 2016, University of South Carolina
School of Law.
1
See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act,
Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980). As of February 2015, seventythree states and territories have ratified or acceded to the Hague
Convention. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, U.S. Hague Convention Treaty Partners,
http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/hagueparty-countries.html (last visited June 17, 2015).
2
International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2 et seq., 22
U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4) (2012).
3
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S.
89 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
4
§ 9001(b)(3)(B).
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governs the extent to which the U.S. honors the judicial decree of a
foreign country.5
This case comment will discuss and evaluate the Fourth Circuit’s
opinion in Smedley v. Smedley.6 This case involves an international
comity decision under the Hague Convention reviewing a German
court’s denial of a Hague petition filed by a father for the return of
his two children to the U.S. after their mother wrongfully removed
them to Germany, and later wrongfully retained by their father in the
U.S.7 The German appellate court denied the father’s Hague petition,
ruling that the defense to wrongful removal (grave risk of harm and
consent) applied under the circumstances.8 In Smedley, the Fourth
Circuit did not find the German appellate court’s decision
unreasonable.9 After a methodical review of the German court’s path
to denial of the father’s Hague petition, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the lower court’s decision, which bestowed comity to the foreign
court, and ordered the return of the children to Germany with their
mother.10

I. HISTORY
The Hague Convention represents a policy-based attempt by the
U.S. and other joined countries to preserve international comity by
trying cases involving child abduction in the country where they
arise. 11 As the Pérez Vera Report states, “the Convention rests
implicitly upon the principle that any debate on the merits of the
question, i.e., of custody rights, should take place before the
competent authorities in the State where the child had its habitual

5

Comity is “[a] practice among political entities (as countries,
states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual
recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.” BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 324 (10th ed. 2014); Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580
F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009).
6
772 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2014).
7
Id. at 187.
8
Id. at 187, 190.
9
Id. at 191.
10
Id.
11
See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at
98.
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residence prior to its removal.”12 When a court “[o]rder[s] a return
remedy . . . [it] allows the courts of the home country to decide what
is in the child's best interests.” 13 Further, “[i]t is the [Hague]
Convention's premise that courts in contracting states will make this
determination in a responsible manner.”14
The Hague Convention often comes into play when one parent
abducts a child from the child’s habitual residence, taking the child to
the abducting parent's home country in order to gain a more favorable
custody ruling.15 When determining a child’s habitual residence, U.S.
courts take into account whether the parents share an intent to make a
particular country the child's home, and whether enough time has
passed for the child to acclimate to the residence.16 If a removal or
retention is found wrongful, Article 12 provides that the parent must
return the child unless certain defenses apply.17 If a defense applies,
return is discretionary.18 Defenses include: (1) the person who had
care of the child “was not actually exercising the custody rights at the
time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently
acquiesced in the removal or retention”; (2) there is a grave risk that
“return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm”;
and (3) “the child objects to being returned and has attained an age
and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its
views.”19
The U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]he merits of [a
foreign] case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the

12

See Elisa Pérez Vera, Explanatory Report on the 1980 Hague
Child Abduction Convention, in 3 ACTS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE
FOURTEENTH SESSION 426, 430 (Permanent Bureau trans., 1982),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf [hereinafter
Pérez Vera Report].
13
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010).
14
Id.
15
See U.S. Interpretation of “Rights of Custody” Under the
Hague Child-Abduction Convention, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 207, 207
(2003); Hague Convention supra note 3, art.1–6, 1343 U.N.T.S. at
98–99.
16
See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 588 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2009).
17
See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 12–13, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 100–01.
18
Id. art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
19
Id.
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judgment, be tried afresh.”20 However, U.S. federal appellate courts
look closely at the merits of the foreign court’s decision in deciding
whether comity can properly be extended to their judgment.21 The
Ninth Circuit indicated that “[e]xtension of comity to a foreign
judgment ‘is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.’”22 Likewise, the
Second Circuit stated that the foreign court’s holding deserves some
“deference, but, in order to determine how much deference,” it is
“appropriate to give some consideration to the subsidiary
determinations that underlie the holding.”23

II. FACTS
Mark Smedley married his wife, Daniela, while he was in the
military stationed overseas.24 They married in 2000, and had two
children while living in Germany.25 Mark was then transferred back
to North Carolina, where he and his family moved in 2010.26 During
a period of marital difficulties while living in the U.S., Daniela told
Mark she wished “to separate and move with the children.” 27
Subsequently, “Mark bought . . . round-trip plane tickets” to
Germany for Daniela and the children “with a return date of August
11, 2011.”28 However, Mark claimed he only consented to a onemonth vacation, while Daniela maintained that he agreed to an
indefinite period of time in which she could reconsider their

20
21

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895).
See Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir.

2009).
22

Id. (quoting Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators
Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2007)).
23
Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2001).
24
Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014).
25
Id. The “children, A.H.S. and G.A.S., were born in 2000 and
2005, respectively[,]” making A.H.S. about fourteen and G.A.S.
about nine years old during litigation in the Fourth Circuit. Id.
26
Id.
27
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 6, Smedley v. Smedley, 772
F.3d 184 (2014) (No. 14-1414), 2014 WL 3572731, at *6.
28
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187.
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separation and think things over.29 Soon after, Daniela informed
Mark that she would remain in Germany with the children, despite
his objections.30
Mark immediately filed a petition in Germany under the Hague
Convention for the return of the children to the U.S.31 The District
Court of Bamberg denied the petition, finding that Daniela
established one of the four Article 13 defenses,32 specifically, the
grave-risk exception.33 The court relied on a report from a courtappointed family advocate who stated that sending the children back
to the U.S. would expose them to a serious risk of physical or
psychological harm.34 Upon Mark’s appeal, the German appellate
court found that he agreed to a permanent move and stated Daniela’s
testimony was more credible.35 “As consent is another of the Article
13 defenses, the court held that” determining the children’s habitual
residence was unnecessary.36
On May 7, 2012, Mark and Daniela obtained a divorce
declaration in Germany.37 The court ordered that both parties share
custody of their children, but directed that the children were to live

29

Id. According to Daniela, “Mark told her that should she fail
to change her mind, he would try to relocate to Germany to be close
to his children.” Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 7.
30
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187.
31
Id.
32
See 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A) (2012) (requiring proof, by
clear and convincing evidence, that one of the exceptions set forth in
Article 13(b) or 20 of the Hague Convention applies); 22 U.S.C. §
9003(e)(2)(B) (demanding proof by a preponderance of the evidence
that some exception set forth in Article 12 or 13 of the Hague
Convention applies).
33
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187.
34
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 6. Mark
allegedly beat both children with his hands, and at times beat the
older one with a belt. Id.
35
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187. The German court held that
Daniela’s testimony was consistent, detailed, coherent, and
corroborated by the older child. Id. at 190.
36
Id. at 187–88.
37
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 11.
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with Daniela in Germany. 38 After almost two years living in
Germany, Daniela agreed to let the children visit Mark in the U.S.;
however, he failed to return them on the agreed upon date.39 Daniela
filed a Hague petition in a district court in North Carolina on April 7,
2014. 40 Acting on that petition, the U.S. district court accorded
comity to the decision of the German appellate court and found that
the “German court’s failure to determine the children’s habitual
residence” based on Mark’s consent was reasonable.41 The U.S.
district court also found the German court’s determination that
Daniela was more credible was at least minimally reasonable, and
“that Germany was the children’s habitual residence” when they
visited Mark in North Carolina.42 On May 2, 2014, pursuant to the
district court's order, Daniela returned to Germany with both
children.43 Mark appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing “the district
court erred in according comity” 44 because the German court
misinterpreted the Hague Convention and its “decision did not meet a
minimum standard of reasonableness.”45

38

Id. at 12. Mark never tried to change this order, dispute its
validity, or argue that the German court lacked power to enter the
custody order. Id.
39
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 188. Mark signed a notarized document
stating that he would pick up the children on or about August 6,
2013, and that the children would be returning on or about August
26, 2013, unless Daniela was otherwise notified. Brief of PetitionerAppellee, supra note 27, at 1. Mark did not return the children
during the designated time, and sent Daniela a Facebook message
stating that he would be keeping the children with him in North
Carolina. Id.
40
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 14.
41
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 188.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 188.
44
Id. at 186.
45
Id. at 190.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. REPORT
The Fourth Circuit delivered its decision in November of 2014,
which affirmed the lower court’s grant of comity to the foreign
judgment.46 The court disagreed with Mark’s contention that the
German court misinterpreted the Hague Convention by failing to
make a habitual residence determination before addressing consent,
stating that it was “pure conjecture.”47 The court noted a habitualresidence determination “was not dispositive or even helpful”48 in
Smedley, as the foreign court found Mark had consented to the
move—one of the four defenses to wrongful removal of a child under
the Hague Convention.49
The court also found the German court’s decision was at least
minimally reasonable concerning Daniela’s testimony being more
credible than Mark’s based on the facts for two reasons.50 First, one
of the children corroborated Daniela’s testimony.51 Second, Mark’s
credibility was further undermined when evidence was produced
showing that he lied to the court about his knowledge of Daniela’s
decision to stay in Germany.52
Next, the court compared the consent determination in
Asvesta v. Petroutsas, where the father wrote an email consenting
only to the temporary travel of his wife and their children, with the
present case and found that no comparable evidence rendered the

46

Id. at 191.
Id. at 189.
48
Id. at 190.
49
Id. at 189–90.
50
Id. at 190.
51
Id. at 191.
52
See id. at 190. Mark initially told the German court that he
first learned of Daniela's decision to stay in Germany the day before
their scheduled return flight. Id. Nine days earlier he wrote a
Facebook post that read in part, “Please come back to me. I am
really taking this hard right now.” Id. Additionally, the German
court found that Mark’s testimony through his lawyer was unreliable
and inaccurate. Id.
47

268

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 11.2

German court’s finding of consent unreasonable. 53 The court
rightfully found the German court’s decision met the requisite
standard of reasonableness, and therefore it properly extended comity
to the foreign adjudication.54 The Fourth Circuit noted that decisions
rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full
faith and credit, but the court will accord considerable deference to
foreign judgments as a matter of comity.55
B. ANALYSIS
Although the Fourth Circuit reached the appropriate result in
Smedley, its strict adherence to the principles of comity could create a
situation in which a court would grant comity despite the fact that a
foreign court fails to meet the necessary standard of reasonableness.
As uniform interpretation is the chief objective of the Hague
Convention,56 situations may arise when courts in other contracting
states misinterpret its provisions. U.S. courts do not have an
established boundary at which to disallow international judicial
deference. The circuit courts have interpreted the law differently—
the Second Circuit accorded comity even though it considered a
foreign court’s judgment “troubling,” yet the Ninth Circuit declined
to extend comity when it found that the foreign court misapplied the
Hague Convention. 57 Moreover, if a court applies the wrong
standard, then the Hague Convention provides neither an
enforcement mechanism nor an oversight body to ensure its proper
implementation. 58
Nevertheless, judges in the U.S. courts
successfully support the principle that “comity is at the heart of the

53

Id. at 191.
Id.
55
Id. at 189.
56
See 22 U.S.C. §9001(b)(3)(B) (2012).
57
Compare Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 146 (2d Cir.
2001), with Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1021 (9th Cir.
2009).
58
See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 2, 241–42 (P.B.
Carter ed., Oxford 1999).
54
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Hague Convention” 59 by citing and relying on the reasoning of
foreign cases.60
One of the purposes of the Hague Convention is to deter parents
from crossing international boundaries in search of a more
sympathetic court.61 When considering this obligation of impartiality,
however, it is questionable whether the German district court fairly
conducted the Hague petition proceedings. Mark was present only
through his attorney when the German court found the testimony of
Daniela, a German citizen, more credible, and that Mark consented to
her move to Germany with the children.62 She claimed Mark told her
that he would try and relocate to Germany to remain close to the
children should she refuse to change her mind during the conditional
move.63 Accepting this assertion as true, Mark did not consent to a
permanent move, but only to a conditional one. Further, Mark
testified that he merely agreed to a one-month vacation, which is
evidenced by the round-trip plane tickets he purchased for Daniela
and the children.64 However, under Article 13(a), courts decide the
issue of consent only by a preponderance of the evidence standard.65
Therefore, after contemplating the corroboration of Daniela’s
testimony by one of the children and the evidence of Mark’s
inconsistency, the German court likely came to the accurate
conclusion that Mark consented to the move.66 Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit correctly found the German court’s finding of consent
at least minimally reasonable. Nevertheless, courts should avoid
conducting such proceedings without both parents present, as well as
59

Diorinou, 237 F.3d at 142.
See Karin Wolfe, A Tale of Two States: Successes and
Failures of the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction in the United States and Germany, 33
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 285, 370 (2000). This shift is not as visible
in Germany because Germany is a civil law country and judges are
not prone to citing cases. Id.
61
See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996);
Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 1999). See also Pub.
Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,505 (Mar. 26, 1986).
62
Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014).
63
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 27, at 7.
64
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 187.
65
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at
101.
66
Smedley, 772 F.3d at 190.
60
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prejudicially ruling in favor of its nation’s citizens in order to
comport with the Hague Convention’s standards of fairness.67
The implementing body of the Hague Convention recognizes the
extreme importance of each signatory member to view all other
contracting nations as having competent courts for custody and
family dissolution determinations.68 The Fourth Circuit’s decision to
accord comity to the German court clearly supports this policy. Thus,
the court established the appropriate precedent to allow U.S. courts to
work with courts of others countries to remedy the wrongful taking
of children across international borders.
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT
1. CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO BE HEARD
When considering the functional impact of Smedley, it is
noteworthy that neither the German courts nor the U.S. courts
discussed the best interests of the children. Although concerns of
international comity are significant, they should “be weighed against
the best interests and safety of” children in Hague Convention
proceedings.69 Courts analogize the Article 13 exception to wrongful
removal or retention—“the child objects to being returned and has
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to
take account of its views”70—with a best interests analysis in which
the child’s preference would not necessarily be given dispositive
weight.71 The Hague Convention does not state the necessary age for

67

But see Wolfe, supra note 60, at 295 (“The definition of
habitual residence applied by German courts often favors the parent
who left a marital residence in another state and returned to
Germany.”).
68
See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at
98.
69
See Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children:
Implications of Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention
on International Child Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 671
(2001).
70
See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at
101.
71
See Wolfe, supra note 60, at 337.
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objection, and seems to defer to the judge to make that
determination.72
U.S. courts are divided on the requisite age of maturity.
Some have found an eight-year-old to be of the necessary age,73
while another court returned a mature nine-year-old over his strong
objections.74 Although courts have considered this factor, one
researcher found that no case in the U.S. relied exclusively on a
child’s objection to deny a return order.75 Unlike courts in the U.S.,
German courts “do not recognize a minimum age at which a child's
objections gain conclusive weight.”76 However, in practice,
“German courts have given more weight to the objections of young
children,” unless “the court finds the child is too young” or has been

72

See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at
101 (“The judicial or administrative authorities may also refuse to
order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of its views.”). See also Pérez-Vera
Report, supra note 12, at 460 (“[T]he very nature of these exceptions
gives judges a discretion—and does not impose upon them a duty—
to refuse to return a child in certain circumstances.”).
73
See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 876, 883 (S.D. Ohio
2002) (considering views of an eight-year-old child who was
composed, calmly and readily answered questions, pointed to New
Zealand on a globe, and indicated her understanding of the difference
between truth and falsehood and of her obligation to tell the truth).
But see In re Zarate, 1996 WL 734613 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding an
eight-year-old lacked maturity when she did not know her birth year
or classes and confused her natural father with her stepfather).
74
See Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347,
1362 (M.D. Fl. 2002) (returning both a mature nine-year-old, whose
undisputed testimony showed he desired to remain in America, and
his younger brother to Argentina).
75
See Wolfe, supra note 60 at 335–36.
76
Id. at 335. Although the views of the child are not dispositive,
“[u]nder German Family law, children's views are required to be
taken into account and it is normal for children, even quite young, to
appear in court.” The Justice Department’s Response to
International Parental Child Kidnaping: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice Oversight of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106 Cong. 34 (1999) (statement of Catherine I. Meyer).
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unduly influenced.77 In Smedley, the German courts disregarded the
children’s wishes in deciding not to return them to the U.S. during
the Hague petition proceedings. However, the children were
approximately seven-years-old and twelve-years-old at the time of
the litigation;78 thus, it is unclear whether they were of the
appropriate age and possessed the requisite degree of maturity for a
U.S. court to consider their views.
While the child's age is important, his or her “emotional and
psychological bonds . . . are also important.”79 Either the judge or
the parties may appoint a psychologist as an expert to help determine
if a child is of sufficient maturity to influence this determination;80
however, only a small number of cases address the appropriate
weight to apply to such an expert's testimony.81 Many courts have
completely rejected psychologists’ testimony by finding it to be
“appropriate in a custody proceeding, not in a Hague Convention
case,”82 while others rely heavily upon it when deciding whether to
apply this exception. 83 Although the German court in Smedley
77

Wolfe, supra note 60, at 335–36.
Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014). The
“children, A.H.S. and G.A.S., were born in 2000 and 2005,
respectively.” Id. Mark filed the Hague petition in 2011. Id.
79
Linda D. Elrod, "Please Let Me Stay": Hearing the Voice of
the Child in Hague Abduction Cases, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 663, 679
(2011).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Morrison v. Dietz, No. 07-1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *12
(W.D. La. Sept. 17, 2008) (failing to accept the psychologist's
determination on whether the mature child or grave-risk exceptions
should apply); Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 489 (1992)
(“Psychological profiles, detailed evaluations of parental fitness,
evidence concerning lifestyle and the nature and quality of
relationships all bear upon the ultimate issue [of custody] to the
appropriate tribunal in the place of habitual residence.”).
83
See, e.g., Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1381 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (agreeing with the psychologist’s opinion that the child
was not old enough or mature enough for the court to consider the
child’s objection in determining whether to return the child, even
though the court considered the child to be an impressive elevenyear-old); Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, No. C-99-961, 2000 WL 1611123
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2000) (allowing two psychologists to provide
78
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appointed a family advocate, the court did not articluate the
advocate’s opinion about whether the children wished to live with
their father in the U.S. or remain in Germany.84
2. THE GRAVE-RISK EXCEPTION
Although the Article 13 grave-risk exception was not dispositive
in Smedley, its interpretation is likely the most debated subject of the
Hague Convention. The concept of comity among nations argues for
very limited use of this exception.85 Accordingly, in Friedrich v.
Friedrich,86 the Sixth Circuit stated that the provision implies much
more than serious risk.87 In Friedrich, a mother made no allegations
of abuse, but instead raised concerns that her child would have
adjustment problems if forced to return to Germany.88 The court held
the grave-risk exception did not apply, but found it would apply in
situations such as returning a child to a nation gripped by “war,
famine, or disease”, as well as in circumstances of returning a child
to a place of “serious abuse or neglect.”89 In addition, the court
stated that the exception should not be an easily satisfied test that
would allow parental child abduction to continue.90 In Smedley, the
testimony regarding the maturity and age of the children involved in
the case).
84
One may infer that the children wished to remain in Germany
since the allegations of the court-appointed family advocate stated
Mark physically abused one of the children and that returning them
to North Carolina would expose them to a serious risk of harm.
Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014).
85
See Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir.
2005).
86
78 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (6th Cir. 1996).
87
Id. at 1068. The court stated that a grave-risk of harm could
exist only in two situations. Id. at 1069. First, when returning the
child before a court can resolve the custody dispute puts the child in
danger. Id. Second, there is a grave-risk of harm when there is a
previous act of abuse or neglect, when the child has an extraordinary
emotional dependence on the accused parent, or when the court in the
country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, is incapable or
unwilling to adequately protect the child. Id.
88
Id. at 1067.
89
Id. at 1069.
90
See id.
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court-appointed family advocate alleged Mark physically abused the
children,91 but it is unclear whether these allegations were serious
enough to satisfy the grave-risk exception.
On the other hand, the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague
Convention maintains that in order to establish the grave-risk defense,
the respondent must demonstrate that the court in the country of
“habitual residence is unwilling or unable to protect” that parent and
child.92 Accordingly, when mothers are granted asylum in the U.S.
for physical abuse, which is derivative to children, many courts find
that the abuse still does not meet the threshold for the grave-risk
defense.93 Consequently, a parent “who has been granted asylum
based on domestic violence . . . cannot be forced to return to that
country.”94 If the court grants a Hague petition and orders the child
returned to its habitual residence, however, the parent must make the
extremely difficult choice between returning to the country of her
abuser or living apart from the child.95
However, many courts in the U.S. are following a “further
analysis” approach to the grave-risk defense.96 The Second Circuit
held that a court could return a child to his place of habitual residence
even if there was a grave-risk of physical or psychological harm, as
long as that country had protocols in place to protect the child from
that risk.97 Similarly, the First Circuit credited the further analysis
approach in allowing courts to examine the “placement options and
legal safeguards in the country of habitual residence to preserve the
child's safety while the courts of that country have the opportunity to
determine custody of the children within the physical boundaries of
their jurisdiction.”98 However, the Eighth Circuit followed a contrary
91

Smedley v. Smedley, 772 F.3d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 2014).
See Catherine Norris, Comment, Immigration and Abduction:
The Relevance of U.S. Immigration Status to Defenses Under the
Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 98 CAL. L. REV.
159, 186 (2010). However, the Hague Convention does not impose
this requirement. Id.
93
Id. at 169.
94
Id. at 189.
95
Id.
96
See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000); Croll
v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 554, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Turner v.
Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 969 (Conn. 2000).
97
See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246–47 (2d Cir. 1999).
98
See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 219.
92
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approach in Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley,99 noting the grave-risk
exception is not based on an inquiry of whether the courts of the
child's habitual residence can offer protection.100 Cases maintaining
the past interpretation of returning the child without further analysis
still exist, but the trend towards further analysis following a finding
of the grave-risk exception is expanding.101

IV. CONCLUSION
Both the U.S. and Germany face the issue of international child
abduction by parents. The Hague Convention proves to be an
effective multilateral treaty by allowing children wrongfully removed
to, or retained in one member state to be returned to their country of
habitual residence so that a court of competent jurisdiction can
properly determine the issue of custody. Its vague provisions present
challenges in interpretation, particularly the objection of the child
and the grave-risk exception, which are being construed
inconsistently by courts of different countries. Further, though the
primary objective of the Hague Convention is securing cooperation
among nations, not all courts are so compliant. Nevertheless, in
Smedley, the Fourth Circuit rigidly applied principles of comity to the
German court’s judgment by finding that its decision was at least
minimally reasonable, thus providing useful precedent for other
courts to do the same.
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58 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 377.
101
Nelson, supra note 69, at 687–88. See Blondin v. Dubois, 19
F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated, 189 F.3d 240 (2d
Cir. 1999).
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